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Abstract
This paper examines whether women’s situation within French boards has improved following the
adoption of a board-level gender quota in 2011. To do so, we focus on the individual role of female
directors as proxied by their fees. Our sample includes the listed companies belonging to the SBF120
index over the 2006-2014 period. We first show that the quota has succeeded in opening the doors of
boardrooms to new, unseasoned female directors (not present on the director labor market before the
regulation). These unseasoned female directors have distinctive characteristics (in terms of indepen-
dence, experience, age, nationality, etc.) as compared to other board members. More importantly, we
show that women, whether unseasoned or seasoned, experience an inner glass ceiling, with “positional”
gender segregation within French boards. In particular, companies have failed so far to open the access
of the most important board committees (namely monitoring committees: audit, compensation and
nomination) to women. It results in a within-firm gender fees gap of 5%. Overall, the quota has rather
amplified this segregation process, with an increase in the average within-firm gender fees gap.
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1 Introduction
Representing almost half of the workforce in Europe, women are still under-represented in corporate
boards. In 2014, only 20% of directorships on average were held by female directors in the largest
European companies, with an important heterogeneity across countries (Adams et al., 2015). In re-
cent years, board diversity has therefore come to the front in public policy: the EU Commission and
Parliament agreed to reach a target of 40% of female directors by 2020. Two competing approaches
exist (see Appendix 6.1). Voluntary approach through codes of governance has been supported by the
UK, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Austria, Poland, Luxemburg and half a dozen countries in the rest
of the world. Following the Norwegian path-breaking move, some countries have adopted a legislative
approach, implementing gender quotas. This is the case of 14 countries including France, The Nether-
lands, Spain, Italy, Germany and Belgium with targets between 30% and 50%. Evaluating the relative
effectiveness of the two approaches is then a priority and has prompted a fierce debate in economics
and finance (Adams et al., 2015; Terjesen et al., 2015).
Improving board-level gender diversity is part of a global agenda promoting gender equality in our
society. But it is also commonly perceived as a way to increase firm accountability and to improve
performance through better corporate governance. First, women are less connected to the old boy
networks that often characterized boards in listed companies (Miller and Del Carmen Triana, 2009;
Nielsen and Huse, 2010; Smith, 2014). Second, female directors appear to have distinct values and
perspectives as compared to male directors (Adams and Funk, 2012), bringing new resources into the
boardroom. A positive relationship between board diversity, corporate governance quality and firm
performance is therefore expected. If one considers that market imperfections (such as taste-based or
statistical discrimination) impeding board access to women are likely to be resilient, then a legislative
approach might be necessary.
However, the Norwegian experience (the first completed implementation of a gender quota in 2008)
provided very mixed results. Ahern and Dittmar (2012) and Matsa and Miller (2013) report in par-
ticular a negative relationship between gender diversity and firm performance. It suggests that the
link between diversity and performance is not straightforward, especially in the case of quotas. Inter-
estingly, it is somewhat reminiscent of the debate on director independence, with a first generation of
studies examining the relation between the share of independent board members and firm performance
- with no conclusive empirical results (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Bhagat and Black, 2001) - and
a second generation investigating the precise characteristics and role of independent directors inside
the boardroom (Adams and Ferreira, 2007; Baldenius et al., 2014; Masulis and Mobbs, 2014). In fact,
reaping the potential benefits of gender diversity raises, just like with independence, two distinct issues.
The first issue relates to director characteristics: clearly, the incidence of a quota - in terms of cor-
porate governance - depends on the attributes of the pool of female candidates. There are reasons
to expect this pool to differ from the pool of male directors, in terms of age, experience, expertise,
etc.: while companies may use female appointments to reconsider their nomination policy and prac-
tices, it is also very likely that they face a supply shortage of female candidates with traditional,
standard characteristics. As argued by Adams and Kirchmaier (2015), this supply shortage regarding
boards is to some extent related to the existence of barriers to female leadership in the labor market.
Incidentally, this may undermine the effectiveness of a quota as a way to improve corporate governance.
2
The second issue relates to roles’ allocation within boards. So far, it has received very little interest in
the literature on gender quotas. Not every director is equal: there exist some key positions inside the
boardroom, associated in particular to committee memberships and committee chairings. Individuals
holding them have a greater ability to shape corporate decisions. Importantly, the distribution of
these positions across board members is very likely to shape the impact of a board quota on corporate
governance and firm performance: for instance, appointing women to comply with the law, but placing
them in non-strategic roles (for example without any committee membership) may reduce the value
of female directors for firms and may jeopardize corporate governance improvements.
Assessing the effectiveness of gender quotas requires answering the two following questions. What are
the main characteristics of female directors appointed to comply with the law? And what role do they
play within the boardroom? This article proposes to answer these two questions, using the French
context as a quasi-natural experiment framework. In January 2011, the Parliament voted the so-called
“Zimmerman-Cope´” law, requiring each gender to represent at least 40% of directors in 2017 with an
intermediate threshold of 20% in 2014.1 Any firm with more than 500 employees and 50 million e of
profit during three following years has to comply with the law.
Our analysis is based on the sample of firms belonging to the SBF120 index in 2011 (i.e. the 120
largest listed firms in 2011 by market capitalization and trading volume on Euronext NYSE-Paris).
They are all concerned by the gender quota. We bring two main findings.
Starting in 2010 (firms have anticipated the success of the political debate), we observe an impressive,
steady growth in the share of female directors. This growth has been to a very large extent fueled
by the appointment of new female directors (unseasoned), who had not already been in a board of a
SBF120 company before 2010. The French quota therefore succeeded in opening the pool of directors
to brand new candidates. We did not report a significant multiplication of directorships for incumbent
(seasoned) female directors - a potential danger of the legislative approach (Adams and Kirchmaier,
2015). Regarding individual characteristics, we show that these unseasoned female directors present
distinctive attributes. They are much more independent and less industry-expert than unseasoned
male directors. They are more often foreigners and have less financial expertise, as compared to sea-
soned directors. Also, they are younger than their male counterparts when entering the director labor
market. We did not observe such differences in individual characteristics between female and male
seasoned board members, except the age of entry. Besides, we observe that the quota has induced a
surge in the tenure gap between male and female board members, suggesting that unseasoned female
directors have replaced males who were relatively newcomers (rather than senior directors).
Regarding director role, we measure it through individual fees (that is board member compensation).
We show that female directors support an average within-firm fee discount of 5% over the whole pe-
riod. This discount is mainly borne by unseasoned female directors. Performing a Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition shows that the gender fees gap is driven, to some extent, by the peculiar characteristics
of female directors. But it also reflects the difficulty they have to enter monitoring committees (with
1The regulation goes beyond the “comply or explain” principle: failure to comply with these schedules will result in
voided appointments and suspended remuneration for directors.
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larger payoffs than advising committees), controlling for their individual observable attributes. Our
empirical results are therefore suggestive of a second, inner glass ceiling: while the quota has allowed
women to break the first glass ceiling (entering the boardroom), it has failed to suppress “positional”
gender segregation within French boards. Ultimately, the French quota has even resulted in an in-
crease in the gender fees gap (from 3.5% on average in 2006-2009 to 5.7% in 2010-2014).
This paper makes the following contributions.
First, the paper complements the literature on the relationship between gender diversity and firm per-
formance by providing fresh evidence on the dynamics of firm compliance to a quota. Lot of attention
has been paid to the gender diversity-performance nexus, especially under quota, without reaching
any consensus (Smith, 2014). Even a natural experiment such as the Norwegian regulation does not
provide the perfect, appropriate empirical framework to correctly estimate the impact of diversity on
performance: some confounding effects, such as other concomitant regulations, early compliers’ effect
and correlated board changes may hide the true gender impact (Ferreira, 2015). Hillman (2015) then
suggests going beyond the effect of gender diversity on performance by investigating how firms comply
with either soft or hard regulation, how female directors are selected and how it impacts board organi-
zation and functioning. Our paper does so, for the French quota. France is a leading OECD economy,
whose national stock exchange is 7 to 8 time larger than the Norwegian one (in terms of stock market
capitalization). It therefore constitutes a unique experience to observe a gender quota in motion.
Our results confirm some arguments or observations previously made on quotas: it forces companies
to select board members in a particular pool, which present distinctive characteristics (Adams and
Kirchmaier, 2015; Bohren and Staubo, 2015). In particular, like in Norway, appointing new female
directors often means appointing independent board members - something that was not necessarily
on the agenda of listed companies. Our results also bring new evidence on the role played inside the
boardroom by female directors following the quota - something that has not been covered so far in the
literature to the best of our knowledge: we report evidence of a new, inner, glass ceiling, preventing
female directors to be the new key players inside French boards. At least on the short run, this may
call into question the efficiency of the French quota.
Second, this paper brings new evidence on the determinant of director fees and on the potential ex-
istence of gender discrimination inside the boardroom. Director compensation has received limited
attention so far, as compared to CEO remuneration; the same is true for gender discrimination among
directors, as compared to gender discrimination on the labor market (whatever the occupation level).
These are, however, crucial questions - the lack of comprehensive information on director fees probably
explaining the relative silence of the literature so far. Like wages, director fees constitute a global
measure of the services provided by individuals (at the very top of listed companies). As such, we
contend that understanding the determinant of these fees and raising the questions of gender dis-
crimination are of interest, from a corporate governance point of view but also from a social, gender
equality, perspective. The studies by Gregory-Smith et al. (2014) and Goh and Gupta (2015) are
the most closely related to ours. They highlight a gender fees gap among directors in Great-Britain,
between 5 and 8% - that they interpret as pure discrimination against women. We provide a rather
similar estimation for French female directors but give an alternative explanation: the gap is entirely
explained by the characteristics and positions of female directors. This suggests that women do not
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have attendance problems (Adams and Ferreira, 2009), and that there is no pure discrimination (con-
sisting in paying differently men and women put in exactly the same position and providing the same
services). Rather, our results are indicative of a gender segregation, with key committees being hardly
accessible for females entering the market with the quota.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a short literature review on gender
diversity and quota, and on director fees. Section 3 provides descriptive statistics on the change in
the pool of directors and board characteristics during the period. Section 4 analyzes the determinants
of director fees and the gender fees gap. Section 5 concludes.
2 Literature review
2.1 Diversity and governance
The importance of board composition in explaining board effectiveness, corporate governance quality
and ultimately firm performance is now a standard assumption in the literature. Board diversity, then,
is expected to have several effects (Carter et al., 2003)2.
From a dependence theory perspective (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978), female directors are often consid-
ered as bringing new resources and competences inside the boardroom, as well as fresh perspectives on
strategic issues (Miller and Del Carmen Triana, 2009; Nielsen and Huse, 2010; Hillman, 2015). A first
reason is simply that they do not belong to traditional “old boys” networks that are so pervasive in
corporate governance matter (Smith, 2014). Also, it is often argued that females have different prefer-
ences, risk attitudes and values than males - even at the board level. Adams et al. (2011) shows that
female directors are generally more stakeholder oriented than male directors. In the same vein, Adams
and Funk (2012) provide evidence that women on board care more about benevolence and universal-
ism, and less about power and achievement. In addition, they are less security- and tradition-oriented
than their male counterparts. These observations suggest that increasing board diversity should lead
to substantial changes in board functioning and decisions.
From an agency theory perspective (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), it has been suggested that diver-
sity enhances the monitoring ability of the board and firm performance. On the one hand, female
directors are often more independent, outside traditional social networks. Consistent with this obser-
vation, Adams and Ferreira (2009) show that women are more likely to be appointed in monitoring
committees (in the S&P500). The Turkish case also exhibits a positive correlation between female
representation and board monitoring (Ararat et al., 2015). On the other hand, female directors have
a better attendance record, at least on U.S. data (Adams and Ferreira, 2009) and this may have a
positive peer effect on male directors’ attendance.
In sum, theory and empirical analysis both make the argument that increasing the fraction of women
on board should not be neutral regarding corporate governance - with an overall improvement in
governance quality. However, the existence of a glass-ceiling against women regarding board access is
unquestionable, in all OECD countries (Terjesen et al., 2009; Ferreira, 2010). Like classic labor market
2A complete literature review on corporate governance has been done by Adams et al. (2010), and on diversity by
Terjesen et al. (2009).
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discrimination, they are persistent inefficiencies that market forces fail to correct over a reasonable
period (Becker, 1957). A quota is expected to fix the problem. In the French case, the first empiri-
cal evidence for the early compliers (belonging to the 40 largest listed companies) suggests that the
gender quota may have improved corporate governance: using panel and frontier regressions, Sabatier
(2015) reports a positive relationship between gender diversity and firm performance (ROA, ROE and
Tobin’s Q) between 2008 and 2012.
2.2 The effects of a gender quota
So far, the vast majority of the literature has focused on the implementation of the gender quota in
Norway - fully enforceable since 2008. Two studies have investigated the relationship between board
diversity and firm performance in detail - stressing the detrimental effects of the regulation. Ahern
and Dittmar (2012) use the heterogeneity of pre-quota female representation inside the boardroom to
instrument the exogenous shock that firms experiment. They show that Tobin’s Q dropped off fol-
lowing the quota. Matsa and Miller (2013) use a triple difference-in-difference strategy across Nordic
countries and across listed (affected by the quota) and non-listed (unaffected by the quota) companies.
They report evidence that treated firms have been less likely to undertake workforce reductions, more
likely to have increased their labor costs and employment levels - with negative effects on profitability.
They also show that the effect has been larger for firms with no female directors before the quota.
Both studies therefore support the idea that the new regulation has come to a cost, making firms
deviate from their optimal board composition from a shareholder value perspective. More precisely,
two costs related with a quota are usually identified.
First, at a broad level, economists are often skeptic regarding the efficiency of a regulatory approach,
especially in corporate governance. Such an approach places new constraints on companies, and does
not take into account firm heterogeneity in terms of business models and corporate governance needs
(Adams et al., 2010). Second, the implementation of a quota necessarily forces firms to appoint direc-
tors from a potential pool that may substantially differ from their usual, male-dominated pool (Hillman
et al., 2002; Singh et al., 2008). It is possible, for instance, that the persistence of a glass-ceiling effect
has impeded the will of many women to become directors, despite their intrinsic ability. The resulting
narrowness of female directors’ pool then acts as a short-run obstacle against the improvement of
corporate governance following a gender quota. In addition, it might lead to a concentration of power
among few female directors presenting the standard, expected characteristics. Amusingly, it might
even generate new ’spinsters’ (old women) networks - the quota was intended to destroy3. Over the
long run however the quota should act as an incentive for women to invest the business.
In the Norwegian case, there are evidences that the characteristics of newly appointed women differed
substantially from incumbent directors. Ahern and Dittmar (2012) show in particular that new fe-
male directors were less likely to have an executive experience, especially a CEO experience, and were
younger. But they also report that they were more educated4. A striking result concerns indepen-
3Seierstad and Opsahl (2011) have provided evidence of such an effect in the Norwegian case, with the creation of a
small elite of female directors. In terms of corporate governance, the literature on busy directors has highlighted that
multi-directorship may destroy shareholder value (Cashman et al., 2012; Falato et al., 2014; Masulis and Mobbs, 2014)
4In the French case, the first female directors appointed after the quota (2010, 2011 and 2012) appears to be similar
to males in terms of education and networks (Allemand and Brullebaut, 2014) but less business experts or CEOs (Dang
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dence (which is the most common criteria to evaluate board ability to protect shareholders’ interests).
Bohren and Staubo (2015) report that the fraction of independent directors jumped from 40% to 67%
following the implementation of the quota. But they show that the stronger the increase in indepen-
dence, the bigger the economic losses after the quota. This result is consistent with several empirical
(Faleye et al., 2011) or theoretical (Adams and Ferreira, 2007) studies pointing out the negative effect
of excessive monitoring (associated with a too high fraction of independent board members).5 In
the French case, Rosenblum and Roithmayr (2015) argue, based on a series of interviews, that board
decision-making process has been changed following the quota, most notably because newly appointed
female directors are more likely to be outsiders.
While this question of new female directors’ characteristics has retained much of the attention in the
literature, it is worth noting that gender quota effectiveness also depends on the assignment of of
committees across board members. Committees are sub-structures comprised of few board members,
in charge of specific functions (typically audit, CEO compensation design, CEO nomination, strategy
and risk policy). Belonging to one of these committees is then highly strategic to influence board
decisions and firm performance (see e.g., Reeb and Upadhyay, 2010). If companies choose to place
new female directors in non-strategic positions inside the boardroom, then there is not much benefits
to expect from a gender quota. To the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence regarding positions’
allocation across gender following a quota. Aside from a quota, there are some disparate evidences on
the position occupied by women in committees. Wearing and Wearing (2004) show on British data
that female directors are less likely to reach the chair position inside committees, while Adams and
Ferreira (2009) report that women are more likely to join monitoring committees (audit, compensation
or nomination).
From a methodological point of view, it is worth noting that estimating a clear relation between diver-
sity and performance using a quota is not a simple task. Ferreira (2015) convincingly argues that the
design of the Norway experiment does not provide a clear identification strategy to estimate the causal
link from diversity to performance. First, the choice of the control group is particularly problematic:
treated and untreated groups are endogenously determined when the quota applies (as some unob-
servables necessarily explain that some firms are unlisted or have no female directors, for instance).
Second, some confounding effects may affect the result, such as the increase in the fraction of indepen-
dent board members (Ferreira, 2010; Bohren and Staubo, 2014). Unfortunately, the French context
does not provide a better framework to analyze this relationship. However, it allows observing in
detail - for a comprehensive sample of large listed companies - the way firms have complied so far with
the regulation, in terms of director appointment and position allocation in boards. More importantly,
we are able to measure individual directors’ role within board. To do so, we need to overcome het-
erogeneity concerns that play at two distinct levels. At the director level, the literature in economics,
finance and management has identified a multiplicity of individual characteristics that all impact on
the way individuals perform their duties. At the position level, there is a multiplicity of committees,
some common to nearly all companies (the audit one), some highly firm-specific. Accordingly, it is
not a simple task to perform an overall assessment of the value of a particular director - associated
et al., 2014)
5Intense monitoring may in particular refrain corporate executives from sharing firm-specific information with inde-
pendent board members, to the detriment of the board advising function and to some extent to the board monitoring
function. Nygaard (2011) finds some supportive arguments on Norway.
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by definition with a bundle of characteristics and positions - comparable across individuals. We will
argue that director fees allow to overcome this problem. In this framework, we interpret substantial
changes over time in within-firm fees distribution as an indication of a change in the relative roles
played by the different directors - and therefore as a sign of a modification in board overall functioning.
2.3 The determinants of director fees
Several papers have examined the relation between director compensation and firm-level or board-level
characteristics, on U.S. data. For instance, Ryan and Wiggins (2004) have looked at the relationship
between fees and board independence, controlling for other firm characteristics. Brick et al. (2006)
have modeled director fees as a function of firm characteristics, CEO characteristics and governance
factors (such as the share of internal directors). In the same vein, Linn and Park (2005) have studied
the relations between investment opportunities and the level of board members’ compensation. The
common point of all these papers is that they are not interested in differences among directors (for
instance gender inequality), as we do. Accordingly, they do not control for any individual director
attributes.
There has been a recent interest for the individual determinants of director fees, opening the way to
an investigation of inequalities across groups of board members. For instance, Mallin et al. (2015) pro-
vides some evidence on UK and Italian data that independent directors are paid more than affiliated
ones, especially in the UK. This study suggests that the status is an important driver of individual
fees. Goh and Gupta (2015) also show on a British sample that being independent is related to a
+11% fees premium; tenure, network and age are also positively related to compensation.
Finally, few papers have examined the gender gap. Pucheta-Martinez and Bel-Oms (2015) report
on a sample of Spanish firms the existence a gender gap, that depends on two elements: (individ-
ual) seniority and the presence of female directors in the compensation committees or in a strategic
position. Taking into account firm heterogeneity and some individual characteristics such as com-
pensation committee membership and chair, age and tenure, Gregory-Smith et al. (2014) also show
that female non-executive directors face a fees gap of around 8%. Goh and Gupta (2015) provide
convergent results. Female directors experiment a gender gap of 5% within firm controlling for indi-
vidual characteristics and some positions (compensation committees). Those results suggest either a
discrimination against female directors or a problem of attendance which directly reduces director fees.
The application of a quota may reduce this gender gap in case of success, or exacerbate it in case of
some inefficiency (such as inner glass-ceiling). It remains an empirical question.
3 Who is entering the boardroom?
Before 2010, the average share of female directors was around 9% for SBF120 companies. In 2010,
this share significantly increased, suggesting that firms have anticipated the success of the political
debate (the legislative regulation had been adopted in January 2011). Since then, the proportion
of female directors has steadily grown up. The sample average share of female directors went over
20% in 2012 and 30% in 2014. This section explores the change in the pool of directors following
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the implementation of the gender quota. Four types of directors are distinguished depending on the
gender (male and female) and the date of entry in the French director labor market (seasoned and
unseasoned). Seasoned directors are individuals sitting between 2006 and 2009 in at least one of the
SBF120 firms. Unseasoned directors are individuals entering SBF120 companies’ boards starting from
2010.
Our firm sample includes the companies belonging to the SBF120 in January 2011 - excluding firms
which have not been observable over the whole period6. We hand-collected detailed information on
directors sitting in any of these companies using (public) annual financial reports, over the 2006-2014
period. Our database contains 115 firms, 2,084 distinct directors and 14,112 director-firm-year obser-
vations. We obtain the following information: gender, age of entry in the pool of SBF120 directors,
nationality, tenure, past professional experience and educational background, individual annual fees,
board sub-committees sitting and chairing and the status (insider, affiliated or independent, following
the definition adopted by the AFEP/MEDEF code)7. Affiliated directors are related to the firm, as
employee representatives, shareholder representatives or individuals with business connections. Inde-
pendent directors have no relationship with the firm, the manager and the blockholders. We use past
or current professional experience to define expertise (see Dass et al., 2014). An individual is defined as
a financial expert if she/he has or has had professional experience in the insurance or financial service
industry. She/he is defined as an industry-expert if she/he has or has had professional experience in
the industry (defined with a one-digit code) of the firm where she/he sits. Table 10 (Appendix 6.2)
defines all the variables.
3.1 Seasoned or unseasoned directors?
We first examine the way companies have complied with the quota, so as to meet the quantitative
target. Table 1 gives information on the flows of directors (newcomers and leavers) on a yearly basis
in the SBF120 firms. Interestingly, the number of appointments per year is rather stable over the
period (around 175) and mostly covers the number of leavers. We therefore observe a progressive,
regular renewal of French boards. Similar to the Norwegian case (Bohren and Staubo, 2015), there
is no drastic increase in board size to reach the quota: the average board size grows up from 12.2 to
12.5 board members between 2009 and 2014. Male directors seem to have been replaced by female
directors so as to meet the quota. Without surprise, the gender balance of new appointments has
deeply changed. In 2006-2009, we observe that roughly one female was appointed for 10 males (14
women appointed in 2006, against 169 males). This strong imbalance ends in 2010, with 110 males
and 65 females among new board members. Since then, the number of female and male directors is
rather similar (88 men and 83 women in 2013 for instance).
6Except REXEL which has been listed in 2007. We exclude APERAM, EDENRED, EDF-Energie nouvelle, Rhodia,
and SILIC.
7This definition is used by the Autorite´ des Marche´s Financiers (which supervises the French stock market). AFEP
(Association Franc¸aises des Entreprises Prive´es) and MEDEF (Mouvement des Entreprises de France) are two represen-
tative organizations at the national level for private sector. Independence is assumed to be compromised if the director
of a company (1) is or has been, within the previous five years, a corporate executive or an employee of that company or
of its affiliates, (2) is employed as an executive of another company where any of that company’s executives sit on the
board, (3) has been the director of the company for more than twelve years, (4) is a representative of a large blockholder
(with at least 10% of stock or voting rights), (5) has a significant business relationship with that company or its affiliates
(as customer, supplier, banker or auditor), (6) is related by close family ties to an executive director.
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Table 1: Directors’ appointments and exits over the 2006-2014 period
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Total
Leavers 179 142 179 138 149 183 177 150 1297
Appointments 183 173 182 178 175 154 185 171 167 1568
Male 169 154 163 152 110 76 106 88 92 1110
Unseasoned 0 0 0 0 80 62 84 59 72 357
Seasoned 169 154 163 152 30 14 22 29 20 753
Female 14 19 19 26 65 78 79 83 75 458
Unseasoned 0 0 0 0 54 67 68 73 67 329
Seasoned 14 19 19 26 11 11 11 10 8 129
Notes: Leavers (resp. appointments) indicates the number of directorships (couple of firm and
director) held by leavers (resp. arrivers) in SBF120 companies (115 firms), by year from 2006 to
2014. Total counts the number of observations over the 2006-2014 period. Unseasoned directors
have been appointed in their first SBF120 firms after the quota (2010). Seasoned directors had
at least one directorship in SBF120 firms between 2006 and 2009. Lecture: there has been 1568
appointments over the 2006-2014 period, while 1297 directors left their directorship over the same
period. For example, in 2010, 175 directors have been appointed in a new directorship and 138
directors left their directorship. Among the appointments, 110 concerned men and 65 women.
Regarding men appointments, 80 were unseasoned and 30 seasoned. Among female directors, 54
were unseasoned and 11 seasoned.
Seasoned women represent a minor part of female appointments made after the quota, and a decreas-
ing one. Out of 65 women appointed in 2010, 11 were already in the market before; in 2014, this
proportion was even smaller, with only 8 seasoned women among 75 appointed females. Only 36 out
119 seasoned female directors get at least a new board seat after the regulation. In contrast, 288
unseasoned female directors enter the pool of directors after the quota. This evidence indicates that
the gender quota has had far-reaching consequences on board functioning and corporate governance,
as it primarily induces the entry of new faces inside French boardrooms. Put differently, we do not
observe a race between companies to hire the (few) seasoned female directors.
Table 2 presents the average tenure of board members. Before the quota, seasoned male and female
directors had similar tenure, around 6.7 years, stable over the sub-period (2006-2009). After the
quota, male average tenure increased, up to 8.5 years in 2014. This growth has been driven by the
4 years jump of the male seasoned directors’ average tenure, that reached 10.7 years at the end of
the period. This evolution suggests that the most experienced male directors kept their seats, while
the latest appointed were replaced by (unseasoned) female directors. Women tenure decreased of 2
years, due to the massive entry of these unseasoned female directors. All in all, this is indicative
of a dualization process inside the boardroom, between seniors on one side and new comers on the
other side - with allegedly different bargaining power. It also suggests that tenure is likely to be an
important determinant of the role of directors inside the boardroom - we shall account for in our
empirical investigations.
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Table 2: Directors’ tenure over the period
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Avg Tenure 6.46 6.64 6.81 6.92 7.12 7.24 7.27 7.33 7.36
Male 6.44 6.64 6.82 6.96 7.41 7.79 8.05 8.33 8.49
Seasoned Male 7.81 8.57 9.36 10.04 10.70
Female 6.64 6.57 6.67 6.52 5.10 4.45 4.35 4.41 4.60
Seasoned Female 6.72 7.20 7.65 8.12 8.70
T-test Male-
Female
-0.20 0.07 0.15 0.44 2.31*** 3.33*** 3.70*** 3.92*** 3.89***
T-test Seasoned 1.09*** 1.35*** 1.71*** 1.92*** 2.00***
Notes: Tenure is the number of years that a director holds her directorship. The average tenure is calculated
on the annual number of directorships in the SBF120 firms. Seasoned directors had been appointed for the
first time between 2006 and 2009 in at least one SBF120 firms. Stars indicate the statistical significance of a
t-test (two-sample tests assuming unequal variances). The first t-test compares male and female tenure while
the second t-test compares seasoned male and female tenure. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and10%
levels is indicated by ***, ** and *.
Table 3: Multi-directorships of directors over the 2006-2014 period
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Number of di-
rectorships
1.31 1.31 1.32 1.31 1.31 1.28 1.28 1.29 1.26
Male 1.31 1.32 1.33 1.32 1.32 1.30 1.29 1.28 1.26
Seasoned Male 1.34 1.33 1.34 1.35 1.34
Female 1.27 1.23 1.23 1.20 1.23 1.22 1.26 1.30 1.26
Seasoned Female 1.29 1.36 1.49 1.60 1.60
t-test Male-
female
0.04 0.09 0.10 0.12* 0.09* 0.08* 0.03 -0.01 0.00
t-test seasoned 0.06 -0.03 -0.15*** -0.25*** -0.27***
Notes: Multi-directorship is the number of boards that a director holds in the SBF120 index in a given year. The
average multi-directorship is calculated on the annual number of directorships in the SBF120 firms. Seasoned
directors had been appointed for the first time between 2006 and 2009 in at least one SBF120 firms. Stars
indicate the statistical significance of a t-test (two-sample tests assuming unequal variances). The first t-test
compares male and female multi-directorship while the second t-test compares seasoned male and female multi-
directorship. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and10% levels is indicated by ***, ** and *.
Multi-directorship (Table 3) is determinant regarding the time devoted to the board and its commit-
tees (see Jiraporn et al., 2009; Masulis and Mobbs, 2014) and busy directors may then reveal poor
corporate governance quality (Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Cashman et al., 2012; Falato et al., 2014).
Multi-directorship is therefore an important indicator to understand how firms have complied with
the law. Regarding the number of seats, there is a no significant difference across gender before and
after the gender quota. But seasoned women have more seats on average than seasoned men at the
end of the period (1.6 against 1.34). It suggests that companies needed to find somehow urgently
female directors to comply with the quota, and have to some extent considered seasoned women -
even if the effect is quite small. It is also important to note that the intensity of multi-directorship
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for unseasoned females is smaller than for (male or female) seasoned directors. In sum, firms seem
to have looked for specific talents rather than chasing the same generic candidates - something that
would have undermined the effectiveness of the gender quota (Adams and Kirchmaier, 2015). Multi-
directorship does not seem to have been the most problematic issue regarding the French gender quota.
3.2 The pool of directors
We now examine the change in the pool of directors in the SBF120 between 2009 (before the regula-
tion) and 2014 (when the threshold of 20% had to be reached by firms). We focus on characteristics
that are likely to impact on corporate governance and are therefore disclosed in annual financial re-
ports. In 2009, there were 1,096 directors and 1,176 in 2014. Table 4 provides information on the
main characteristics of unseasoned female directors (275 distinct individuals in 2014), as compared
to the other three categories, namely unseasoned males (285), seasoned females (109 in 2009) and
seasoned males (by far the largest, with 987 distinct persons). Only time- and individual-invariant
characteristics are considered for the moment: gender, age of entry in the pool, nationality, tenure,
educational background, and financial expertise.
As suggested by Masulis et al. (2012), foreign directors may have specific costs and benefits for corpo-
rate governance quality. They are associated with better mergers and acquisitions abroad. But they
are also associated with a lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance and with a lower atten-
dance. We observe in Table 4 that the share of foreigners among unseasoned female directors is high,
at 37%, including 21% coming from European Union member States and 11% from North America.
This proportion is significantly higher than what we observe for all other categories of directors. As
such, this difference suggests the existence of a supply shortage of native female directors. By contrast,
seasoned female directors are less often foreigner than seasoned male directors.
Regarding social connections, Kramarz and Thesmar (2013) and Nguyen (2012) highlight that French
educational networks play a strategic role in boards (Appendix 6.3) and may be detrimental to corpo-
rate decisions. We may think that as outsiders, unseasoned female directors are less likely to be part
of these networks. However, networks may also help to secure the appointment of talented candidates
in a short period of time, as it conveyed private information on individuals. The only meaningful
large difference between male and female directors concerns the Ecole Polytechnique network (the
leading French engineer school): only 6% of unseasoned female directors graduated from the Ecole
Polytechnique, similar to seasoned females. In contrast, the share of Ecole Polytechnique graduates is
at least twice larger for males (whether seasoned or unseasoned). This is hardly a surprise, insofar as
the under-representation of women in this prestigious engineer school is well documented (Chauvel,
2004). Clearly, we have here a pure supply shortage effect. For the other Grandes Ecoles (l’ENA, the
school for high civil servants; HEC-ESSEC-ESCP, the leading business schools; and IEP, the leading
school of political science), there is no statistical difference between men and women.
The literature on financial expertise (see for example Defond et al., 2005; Burak Guner et al., 2008;
Reeb and Zhao, 2013) shows that such expertise improves board effectiveness and the quality of cor-
porate disclosure. We observe a significant shortage of financial expert unseasoned female directors,
as compared to seasoned males (43% against 57%). While non-significant at conventional level, the
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Table 4: Characteristics of unseasoned and seasoned directors, by gender
Unseasoned Seasoned Difference (t-test)
Female Male Female Male
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1)-(2) (1)-(3) (1)-(4) (3)-(4)
Nationality
Foreigner 0.37 0.32 0.18 0.25 0.06* 0.19*** 0.12*** -0.07*
(1.37) (3.67) (3.98) (-1.61)
British 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04*** 0.02 0.01 -0.01
(2.96) (0.87) (0.81) (-0.48)
German, Belgian 0.06 0.07 0.02 0.05 -0.01 0.04** 0.01 -0.04*
(-0.40) (1.77) (0.45) (-1.64)
Spain, Italy 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.04* 0.00 -0.03*
(0.48) (1.58) (0.19) (-1.54)
EU 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.02
(-0.62) (1.00) (0.15) (-0.99)
North American 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.06*** 0.04**
(1.00) (0.68) (4.12) (1.95)
Other Nationalities 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04* 0.05*** 0.00
(0.81) (1.58) (3.76) (0.27)
Education
Grande Ecole 0.29 0.32 0.30 0.41 -0.02 -0.01 -0.11*** -0.11**
(-0.63) (-0.16) (-3.44) (-2.14)
Ecole Polytechnique, Mines 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.14 -0.06*** 0.00 -0.08*** -0.08***
(-2.37) (0.06) (-3.37) (-2.11)
ENA 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.12 -0.03 -0.00 -0.04** -0.04
(-1.25) (-0.16) (-1.84) (-0.99)
HEC, ESSEC, ESCP 0.11 0.14 0.18 0.15 -0.03 -0.07** -0.04 0.04
(-1.09) (-1.76) (-1.43) (0.95)
IEP 0.17 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.05 0.02 -0.01 -0.03
(1.43) (0.43) (-0.21) (-0.61)
Other characteristics
Financial Expertise 0.43 0.42 0.50 0.57 0.01 -0.06 -0.13*** -0.07
(0.19) (-1.11) (-3.95) (-1.42)
Age of Entry 49.66 52.37 46.35 51.22 -2.71*** 3.31*** -1.56*** -4.87***
(-3.789 (3.18) (-2.40) (-4.81)
Number of directors 275 285 109 987
Notes: Averages of individual characteristics of directors in SBF120 companies in 2009 and 2014. Unseasoned
refers to directors who arrived in the pool of directors from 2010 to 2014. Seasoned are directors who were in the
pool before 2010. Observations are persons. Foreigner is a non-French director. Ecole Polytechnique is the leading
French engineer school. ENA (Ecole Nationale d’Administration) is a specific school for high civil servant. HEC,
ESSEC and ESCP are the three leading business school in France. IEP is a leading school in political science.
Financial Expertise is a dummy equal to 1 if the director has a professional experience in finance. Age of entry is
the age of the director when she was appointed for the first time in one of the SBF120 firms. Statistical significance
is reported by t-statistics in parentheses from two-sample tests assuming unequal variances. Statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is indicated by ***, ** and *.
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difference with seasoned females is still important (see (1)-(3)). In contrast, there is no difference
across gender among unseasoned directors: this observation suggests that the lack in financial exper-
tise among unseasoned female directors is induced by firms’ choice, rather than by a supply-shortage
of candidates holding this attribute. At the board level, on average, the share of financial experts
drops from 59% to 52% between 2009 and 2014.
Finally, unseasoned female directors are significantly younger than both unseasoned and seasoned male
directors when entering the pool (less than 50 years old, against 52.4 and 51.2). Interestingly, seasoned
female directors entered the pool of French directors at a much younger age that all other categories,
at 46.4 years on average. This observation indicates that the females who have been appointed before
the quota had peculiar characteristics, related to the age and explaining that they have been able to
break the glass ceiling in the “dark age”. Simply put, they may be highly dynamic individuals, with
trail-blazing carriers that have put them at the very top of large companies.
3.3 The pool of directorships
We end up our investigation with two important “board-related” (rather than intrinsic) character-
istics: independence and industry-specific expertise. Both characteristics are usually considered as
criteria of good corporate governance quality (Adams et al., 2010; Faleye et al., 2013), in relation to
the monitoring function for the former and to the advising function for the latter.
Table 5: Board related attributes of unseasoned and seasoned directors, by gender
Unseasoned Seasoned Difference (t-test)
Female Male Female Male
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (1)-(2) (1)-(3) (1)-(4) (3)-(4)
Independent 0.65 0.33 0.51 0.47 0.32*** 0.14*** 0.18*** 0.04
(7.91) (3.02) (5.55) (1.03)
Industry Expert 0.43 0.67 0.48 0.57 -0.24*** -0.05 -0.14*** -0.09***
(-5.90) (-1.15) (-4.32) (-2.21)
Notes: Averages of director status in SBF120 companies (%). Unseasoned refers to directors who arrive
in the pool of directors from 2010 to 2014. Seasoned are directors who were in the pool before 2010.
Observations are directorships (person-firm-years). Statistical significance is reported by t-statistics in
parentheses from two-sample tests assuming unequal variances. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels is indicated by ***, ** and *.
Table 5 shows that regarding independence, there is no statistical difference between seasoned women
and men. In contrast, there is a very large, significant difference in the proportion of independent
directorships between unseasoned women and unseasoned men: directorships held by women arriving
since 2010 are on average 65% independent, against 33% for men. Regarding industry expertise, we
observe the opposite pattern. It is not a surprise, as the definition of independence proposed by corpo-
rate governance codes in most jurisdictions does not favor industry-specific or firm-specific expertise.
Table 5 shows that only 43% of unseasoned female directorships bring industry-expertise - against
67% for unseasoned male directorships.
14
Summing up, we have provided evidence that unseasoned female directors, massively appointed to
comply with the gender quota, substantially differ from other group of directors, in terms of individ-
ual and board-related characteristics. In particular, we have reported that unseasoned female directors
are more often foreigners, are younger, and are more independent and less industry-expert than men
(seasoned or unseasoned). The difference between seasoned female and male directors is not so im-
portant, except for the age. Overall, female directors are, to a large extent, independent - much more
independent than male directors - and less industry expert. They are therefore a priori well-suited
to endorse a monitoring role (rather than an advising role) (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Bohren and
Staubo, 2015).
4 What role for women inside the boardroom?
Our objective is to evaluate the role played by female directors inside the boardroom, following the
introduction of the gender quota. By role, we mean the overall importance or influence of a particular
individual, its ability to set the tone at the top of large companies. This ability depends at least on
three elements: the position held by the person (in terms of committees membership and chairing),
her attendance (Adams and Ferreira, 2008, 2009; Masulis and Mobbs, 2014), and, to a lesser extent,
what we can call her “function” (vice-chairman, lead independent, etc.).
On average, committees are composed of 3 individuals. Just like in the U.S. or in the U.K., the audit
committee, which supervises firm’s accounts and annual reports, is the most common one: it has been
promoted by the AFEP/MEDEF Code since 1995 and is compulsory by law for listed firms since
2008. Compensation and/or nominating committees are also very common, albeit not compulsory:
more than 98% of SBF120 companies have at least one committee dealing with these issues in 2014: for
64% it is a unique structure, for the rest (36%), there are two distinct committees. Those committees
are responsible for designing managers’ compensation and selecting the CEO and new directors. Both
committees are dedicated to the monitoring function, together with the audit committee. In addition,
more and more “advising” committees are established inside the boardroom to provide advices and
outlooks on firm-specific issues - such as strategy, risk and technology management, corporate social
responsibility, nuclear waste management, etc. Those committees are highly heterogeneous across
firms. Even if the audit committee is usually described as the most important committee, some firms
give more value to the compensation or strategic committee.8 Moreover, the service or effort required
in each committee may be very heterogeneous across firms: in particular, the number of meetings for
each committee is highly variable across firms and years.
Information regarding committees is fully disclosed in the annual reports. In contrast with positions,
individual attendance is not disclosed by French companies. Functions, like committees, are usually
observable, but are highly heterogeneous across firms. At this stage, we therefore face a challenge:
how to measure individual roles, when they depend on one unobservable variable (attendance) and on
two elements which are quite heterogeneous across companies (positions and functions)? We propose
8For example, Dexia, a French and Belgian bank, values the audit committee meeting at 2,000e, more than the
compensation-nomination committee (1,500 e). Biomerieux, a pharmaceutical firm, does the opposite (2,500eversus
3,000e).
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to use director compensation (fees). Similarly to standard models in labor economics, we assume that
remuneration captures the value or the service individuals bring to the organization - except if there
is some discrimination. Importantly, the allocation of fees among directors precisely depends on the
three elements we want to measure to evaluate individual roles. First, it depends on individual posi-
tions (inside the boardroom): the vast majority of firms pay extra fees for committee memberships,
and reward differently the participation to different committees. Second, it depends on individual
attendance. Only 17% of firms in our sample do not take into account directors’ attendance in the
fees calculation. Ignoring attendance is in contradiction with the AFEP/MEDEF code of governance,
and is decreasing over period, from 26 firms in 2006 to 11 in 2014. Finally, most firms also have
additional fees for directors who supply some specific services as recommended by the AFEP/MEDEF
code. These specific services could be sitting or chairing in some committees (with sometimes a
variable part linked with attendance) or assuring some specific functions such as lead directors or
vice-chairman. Accordingly, we contend that director fees are a common metric that can be used to
evaluate director roles, within and across firms.
This section first analyzes the variation of director fees within firms in order to identify their deter-
minants. Doing so allows to observe a within firm gender fees gap. We then examine the relative
influence of the various gender gap determinants, using the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. More
precisely, we quantify the part (of the gender gap) due to individual characteristics, the part due to
positions, and eventually the part due to pure gender discrimination. A gender fees gap mainly related
to individual characteristics would point out issues regarding the pool of female candidates (due to
a supply shortage). A gender gap mainly related to positions (controlling for characteristics) rather
means that companies do have some discretion in the way they allocate different individuals across
positions. It would therefore suggest that firms have so far failed to put female directors in strategic
positions - even considering that these new directors have peculiar individual observable characteristics.
4.1 The determinants of director fees
Like in the previous section, the sample comprises 115 distinct firms over the 2006-2014 period. As
we are mainly interested in director fees, we now exclude directors who do not directly receive the
fees such as executive directors (insiders), some shareholder representatives (State representatives for
example) or employee representatives. Also, we exclude chairmen of the board because in many cases,
the chairman and the CEO are the same person (50% of firm-year observations) and are not com-
pensated specifically for their job of director. We eliminate directorship corresponding to directors
entering or exiting the boardroom in the course of the year, as they are likely to be less involved at the
board-level. We drop two firms that pay directors in dollars and follow the SEC regulation (Arcelor
Mittal and Stmicroelectronics), and two companies (Alten and SES) that do provide individual in-
formation on fees for the whole period. Finally, we trim the director fees at the 1 and 99% levels in
order to avoid our estimation being driven by outliers. In the end, we have 7,904 individual-firm-year
observations for 111 distinct firms and 1,498 distinct directors over the 2006-2014 period. Table 6
presents the descriptive statistics of the sample.
We make the distinction between three categories of committee: audit, compensation-nomination and
advice. Compensation-nomination covers committees related to CEO compensation and nomination
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whatever the structure (one or two-tiers). The ’advice’ category groups all committees which are not
dedicated to monitoring functions. In Table 6, we observe that 38% of the directorships correspond to
the audit committee, and 40% to the compensation-nomination committee. For the advise committee,
the share is 28%. On average, there are almost 3 committees per board with a strong heterogeneity
across firms (from 1 to 6 distinct committees).
There is a large heterogeneity across firms in terms of director fees overall budget, related to the
size and the industry (see also Goh and Gupta, 2015). In our data, the first decile of the individual
fees distribution is less than 15,000e, the median is around 36,000eand the last decile is higher than
75,000e. Moreover, there is an increasing temporal trend of the mean director fees over the 2006-2014
period (Figure 1, Appendix 6.4). Two main reasons may explain this growth. On the one hand, the
number of committees (and then the workload) is growing over the period, from 2.2 to 2.8 committees
per firm on average. On the other hand, the number of meetings related to committees’ activity is
also significantly increasing, from 10 meetings in 2006 to 13 meetings in 2014. Then, over the period,
the duties of directors have significantly increased without any relation with the regulation on gender
diversity.
The objective of our empirical analysis is to compare director fees within firms in order to identify
the impact of individual characteristics and position heterogeneity. In order to overcome the temporal
growth in fees and firm heterogeneity, the econometrics baseline model we use is a firm-year fixed
effect model. Following the previous literature (Gregory-Smith et al., 2014; Goh and Gupta, 2015), we
also introduce a set of individual characteristics (gender, seasoned/unseasoned status, age, nationality,
tenure (and square), number of boards, education and expertise) and positions (committees member-
ships and chairing). The estimated model is then:
yi,j,t = βXi,j,t + µj,t + i,j,t (1)
Where yi,j,t is the logarithm of fees for director i in a firm j in year t, Xi,j,t is a vector of individual
characteristics (and eventually positions) and µj,t are firm-year fixed effects. The error term is clus-
tered at the firm level.
Without any control, we observe that female directors earn on average 5.6% less than their male
counterparts in the same firm (around 2,500e). While director fees distribution criteria are a priori
independent from gender, women are on average less paid than men (within firm). The subsequent
regressions try to better understand this gap.
In the second section, we have discussed the fact that there is a strong heterogeneity across directors in
terms of intrinsic attributes and board-related characteristics. This heterogeneity may drive the gross
gender fees gap we observe. To check this, we regress the (log)fees on a set of individual attributes
(see Table 7, model 1): the seasoned/unseasoned status interacted with gender, the tenure (in log),
the independent status, the nationality (foreigner or not), the age, a dummy that takes value 1 if the
individual is a busy director, education, financial expertise and industry expertise.
We find that controlling for individual attributes, unseasoned female directors support an average
discount in fees of 6.1%, as compared to male seasoned directors. By contrast, we do not observe
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Panel A : Directors’ characteristics
Female 7904 0.16 0.37 0 1
Unseasoned 7904 0.12 0.33 0 1
Seasoned Female 7904 0.10 0.3 0 1
Unseasoned Female 7904 0.06 0.24 0 1
Unseasoned Male 7904 0.06 0.23 0 1
Tenure 7904 7.41 6.13 2 64
Independent 7904 0.63 0.48 0 1
Unseasoned independent 7904 0.07 0.26 0 1
Foreigner 7904 0.23 0.42 0 1
Age 7904 60.18 9.66 23 95
Busy director 7904 0.70 1.12 0 7
Grande Ecole Eduction 7904 0.44 0.49 0 1
Financial Expertise 7904 0.60 0.49 0 1
Industry Expertise 7904 0.46 0.5 0 1
Panel B: Position inside the boardroom
Audit committee 7904 0.38 0.49 0 1
Audit committee chair 7904 0.10 0.3 0 1
Number of Audit meeting 7904 1.95 2.87 0 18
Compensation/Nomination
Committees
7904 0.40 0.49 0 1
Compensation/Nomination
Committees Chair
7904 0.11 0.31 0 1
Number of Compensa-
tion/Nomination Committees
meetings
7904 1.8 2.82 0 23
Advice committees 7904 0.28 0.45 0 1
Advice committees Chair 7904 0.04 0.21 0 1
Number of Advice meetings 7904 1.13 2.31 0 23
Panel C: Directors fees
Directors fees 7904 43389 25304 4500 146400
Director fees ratio 7904 1 0.29 0.08 3.65
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics at the director-firm-year level. Panel
A provides individual characteristics such as gender, unseasoned and interaction, inde-
pendent status, tenure, age, foreigner, busy director, financial expertise and industry
expertise. Definitions are provided in Table 11 (Appendix 6.2). Panel B indicates the
positions inside the boardroom. Audit, compensation-nomination and advice com-
mittees dummies reflect the committees where the director sits in. The chair dummies
are equal to 1 if the director chairs the committee. The number of meetings indicates
the annual number of meeting for the related committees. Panel C informs on an-
nual directors fees (and their logarithm). Director fees ratio is the rate of the annual
individual director fees relative to the annual firm average director fees.
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any significant fees gap for the other groups of directors (seasoned women and unseasoned males).
Controlling for individual characteristics, it means that the gender fees gap is mainly supported by
unseasoned females. Model 1 also allows to observe that independent directors have a premium of
15% relative to affiliated directors, whereas more experienced individuals, proxied by the age (0.3%
by year), are better off than the others. The tenure is also strongly significant: each supplementary
year is rewarded by a 1.1% increase in the fees.
We investigate in models 2 and 3 the role of positions in determining individual fees. We introduce
a set of dummy variables that take value 1 if the person sits in the different committee and a set of
dummy variables if the person chairs respectively the audit committee, the compensation or nomina-
tion committee and one of the advice committees. In model 3, we replace the dummy variables by the
number of meetings.
In model 2, the audit committee is related with a 28% positive difference, followed by the compensa-
tion or nomination committee (21%) and the advice committee (18%). This ranking is consistent with
the relative importance given to the different committees in corporate governance debates and codes.
The same pattern is observable for chairing each specific committee (with a premium going from 18%
to 15%). Interestingly, the value of the coefficients associated with independence, tenure and age (that
play the larger role in the previous model) is strongly reduced, indicating that they are important
drivers of positions. Independent director is now not significantly different from zero. Busy directors
are related with a lower fee, around 1% per extra-board at a 10% significance level: it indicates that
busy directors may be less involved in board functioning than other board members. Model 3 replaces
the dummy variables for each committee by the number of meetings to be closer to the required effort.
The results are largely consistent. Each audit meeting is related to a 5% increase whereas compensa-
tion, nomination committees and advice committees are respectively associated with a 3.9 and 3.8%
increase.
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Table 7: The determinant of director fees
Log (Directors’ fees)
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Seaoned Female -0.005 0.012 0.014
(0.027) (0.019) (0.018)
Unseasoned Female -0.061*** -0.020 -0.007
(0.022) (0.019) (0.019)
Unseasoned Male -0.022 0.001 0.007
(0.027) (0.021) (0.022)
Tenure 0.011*** 0.002 0.003
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Tenure (sqare) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Independent 0.153*** 0.028 0.037*
(0.027) (0.021) (0.021)
Foreigner -0.030 -0.013 -0.019
(0.026) (0.019) (0.020)
Age 0.003** 0.001 0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Busy Director -0.004 -0.009* -0.007
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Grande Ecole Education 0.018 -0.021 -0.023
(0.021) (0.015) (0.016)
Financial Expertise 0.024 -0.003 -0.003
(0.018) (0.013) (0.012)
Industry Expertise 0.002 0.005 0.001
(0.017) (0.012) (0.012)
Audit 0.283***
(0.024)
Audit Chair 0.182*** 0.203***
(0.023) (0.021)
Compensation/Nomination 0.212***
(0.017)
Compensation/Nomination 0.148*** 0.166***
Chair (0.019) (0.019)
Advise 0.176***
(0.017)
Advise Chair 0.146*** 0.138***
(0.033) (0.032)
Audit Meetings 0.049***
(0.004)
Compensation/Nomination 0.039***
Meetings (0.003)
Advise Meetings 0.038***
(0.003)
Constant 10.178*** 10.136*** 10.130***
(0.070) (0.051) (0.051)
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Observations 7,904 7,904 7,904
Nb Firms 113 113 113
R-squared 0.792 0.865 0.866
R2-adj 0.763 0.846 0.847
Notes: (1) The dependent variable is the logarithm of director fees (2) The in-
dependent variables are dummy variables representing gender interacted with the
seasoned/unseasoned status, tenure, squared tenure, independent (dummy vari-
able), foreigner (dummy variable), age, busy director (number of boards in the
SBF120 index for a given director in a given year), dummies for Grande Ecole Ed-
ucation, financial expertise and industry expertise, committees dummy variables
(audit, compensation or nomination, advising) which takes 1 if the director sits
in (model 2), committees chair variables which take 1 if the director chairs the
related committee (models 2-3), and the number of specific committee meetings
that the directors should attend during one year (model 3). (3) Models are firm-
year fixed effects. (4) Robust standard errors, clustered by firm, in parentheses.
(5) Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Importantly, there is no significant difference between groups of directors (as defined by the sea-
soned*gender interaction) when we take into account committees. Put differently, differences in po-
sitions mainly explain the conditional (on individual observable characteristics) fees gap we observed
for unseasoned female directors (-6.1%, in model 1). Our empirical analysis is therefore indicative
of a ”‘positional”’ gender segregation - that echoes the occupational gender segregation commonly
observes in the labor market (see Ponthieux and Meurs, 2015): even with similar observable charac-
teristics, women and men do not occupy the same positions / occupations. And because the positions
predominantly held by female directors are probably less rewarding than the positions predominantly
held by males, positional segregation largely explains the gender fees gap we observe. This also means
that the different groups of directors do not exhibit specific attendance problems: otherwise, we would
have observed a significant correlation between the different groups (seasoned*gender) and fees even
when controlling for positions. This result is then different from the observation made by Adams and
Ferreira (2009) who show on US data that female directors have a better attendance record and that
there is a peer effect on male directors. Two explanations are possible. First the authors used the
1996-2003 period when the attendance issue was more serious than nowadays. Second, attendance
issue is more individual specific than group specific here.
To conclude, female directors support a (within firm) gross fees gap of 5.6% over the whole period.
When controlling for individual characteristics, we observe that the fees gap persists for unseasoned
female directors (6.1%): for a given status (independence), tenure, etc., these new comers apparently
play a secondary role inside boardrooms. We then show that it is largely explained by the positions (in
terms of committee membership and chairing), minoring the role of attendance issues. This result is
indicative of a second ’inner’ glass ceiling supported by unseasoned female directors: while the quota
has allowed women to enter French boards, it seems it has not succeeded to prevent a ’positional’
gender segregation process inside boards.
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4.2 Why do female directors fail to be the new key players?
Frequently used in labor economics, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition enables to measure the con-
tribution of various factors to pay differences across groups (Oaxaca and Ransom, 1999; Fortin et al.,
2011). In particular, it splits the wage gap into two components: the explained (by observables)
part and the unexplained part. The unexplained part is generally considered to measure “pure” dis-
crimination against a given group. The gender wage gap has been extensively examined using this
decomposition in order to disentangle discrimination against women from differences in terms of indi-
vidual characteristics and environment (industry, firm size) (Bertrand and Hallock, 2001; Kahn, 2015).
Bertrand and Hallock (2001) show for instance that the gross gender wage gap between female and
male top managers is around 45% over the 90’s in US of which 75% is explained by firm size and
position inside the firm. Female top managers are less likely to reach the most rewarding positions
such as CEO, chairman or vice-president. 5% remains unexplained after controlling for age and tenure,
suggesting the existence of discrimination.
In our set-up, the explained part provides an estimation of the gender fees gap due to the fact that fe-
male and male directors do not have the same observables, here individual or board-related attributes
and positions. In contrast, the unexplained part gives an estimation of the differential in return across
gender of each observables (as a measure of discrimination), but also an estimation of the effect of
unobservable predictors. Regarding director fees, one such unobservable predictor comes in mind: the
individual attendance. In sum, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition complements the fees equation pre-
viously estimated, in providing a precise decomposition of the gender gap into the diverse components
we have identified so far (individual attributes, positions, unobservables such as attendance).
Like before, we focus our attention on gender fees gap within firm. To avoid introducing firm-year
fixed effect in the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (and having some singular matrix in the estimation
process), we use as a dependent variable the ratio of individual director fees relative to the annual
average firm director fees. It corrects ex ante for the heterogeneity across firms (every year) and
measures the fraction of the firm-average director fees captured by each individual. The range is
extensive, from 8% to 365% depending on the role inside the boardroom. Here, 8% means that the
director receives less than 10% of the average individual fees paid in her/his company.
The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition explains the mean outcome difference between two groups (here
male and female) (see Jann, 2008, for further explanation). First, we estimate for each group the
model explaining the ratio (RGi,j,t, G=F (female) or M (male)) by the same variables used before: in-
dependence and unseasoned/seasoned statuses, individual characteristics (age, tenure and its square,
education, industry expertise, financial expertise) and positions (audit, compensation-nomination, ad-
vice and chair positions) (Xi,j,t).
RMi,j,t = βMX
M
i,j,t + i,j,t (2)
RFi,j,t = βFX
F
i,j,t + i,j,t (3)
where RMi,j,t is the director fees ratio for male or female, Xi,j,t is the vector of dependent variables, and
i,j,t the error term. E[i,j,t] = 0 by assumption.
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Second, the Oaxaca-Blinder approach decomposes the mean outcome difference (D) in two parts: the
explained (Q) and the unexplained (U) parts.
D = E[RMi,j,t] − E[RFi,j,t] = E[XMi,j,t]′βM − E[XFi,j,t]′βF = Q+ U (4)
The Q, or “explained” part, measures the differential due to the group difference in the dependent
variables, depending on male coefficients (βM ). Here we assume that if there is discrimination, it
is directed towards female directors: this is why the male coefficients are taken as reference for the
explained part of the fees gap. Then Q can be written as follow:
Q = (E[XMi,j,t] − E[XFi,j,t])′βM (5)
The U, or “unexplained” part, measures the differential due to all potential effects of unobservable
mechanisms such as discrimination but also different returns of observables (difference between male
and female coefficients).
U = D −Q (6)
Table 8 provides the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the director fees ratio by gender over the pe-
riod. To ease the reading, we split the independent variables in different groups. Two dummies are
first isolated, corresponding to the independent and unseasoned statuses. The other individual char-
acteristics (age, tenure, squared tenure, education, industry expertise, financial expertise and busy
directors) are grouped together: on the output tables, we therefore report the cumulative effect of all
these characteristics. Regarding positions, we adopt the following presentation: Audit groups together
the two dummies informing on the audit committee (whether the individual sits in the committee,
and whether she/he chairs it): we report the cumulative effect (on the gender fees gap) of these two
dummies. Compensation does the same for the compensation/nomination committee, and Advise for
the advise committee.
The difference between the predicted man and woman fees is around 5%. It is very close to the gross
discount for female directors of 5.6% estimated in our previous log(fees) equation. This difference is
divided in 4.4% explained by the predictors and 0.6% unexplained. The unexplained part is insignifi-
cant, meaning that there is no pure discrimination (different return of individual characteristics) or no
effect of unobservable predictors. It confirms that attendance problem plays a minor role to account
for pay differences across gender. Accordingly, it gives credence to our previous (log) fees equation,
which are unlikely to suffer from omitted variables bias. Looking at the explained part of the gender
gap, we observe the following effects. The fact that on average female directors are more independent
than male directors is related to an increase of 0.1% of women fees relative to men fees. In the oppo-
site, the fact that there is a larger share of unseasoned members among women as compared to men
tends to increase the gender gap (0.8%). The differences in terms of other individual characteristics
between male and female directors are associated with a 1.2% gender fees gap. Within individual
characteristics, the two main determinants are tenure and age (with similar fitted coefficient: 0.005,
significant at the 1% level). Overall, almost one half of the (explained) gender fees gap is related to
the fact that female directors do not have on average the same characteristics or statuses than male
directors (1.9% out of 4.4%).
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The differences in positions are responsible for more than one half of the gender fees gap, driven by
differences regarding the access to the audit committee (1.7%) and, to a lesser extent, the nomination-
compensation committee (0.8%). The access to the monitoring committees seems therefore to be
responsible for the main part of the gender fees gap. It supports the idea of the existence of an inner
glass ceiling for female directors within French boards.
Restricting the sample to the years preceding the quotas (i.e. with only seasoned directors) shows
that the gender fees gap was significant, albeit less important (3.7%). Once again, the unexplained
part is non significant. Regarding the explained part, we observe that individual characteristics do
not play a significant role in the gender fees penalty: it indicates that seasoned women, who succeeded
in breaking the glass ceiling in the dark age, present a bundle of characteristics that made them play
a rather similar role than men. There is in particular no significant difference between seasoned men
and seasoned women regarding tenure (see Table 2), and the differences in nationality and financial
expertise are almost non-significant (see Table 4, Difference (t-test) (3)-(4)). Positions tell a different
story: they explained much of the gender gap. In particular, the access to the audit committee is
associated with a 2.6% gender gap, while the access to the advise committee is related to a 0.8%
penalty for women.
Looking at the years following the quota (2010-2014), our decomposition reports an increase in the
gender fees gap, that reaches 5.7%. The unexplained part is non-significant. The explained part is
due for one third to individual characteristics, and for two thirds to positions: once again, the audit
committee explains an important part of the difference in pay between men and women. But the ac-
cess to the remuneration/nomination committee becomes significant, while it did not play as a penalty
factor in the pre-quota era. We therefore observe that the within-firm segregation process has slightly
changed over time: it now concerns all monitoring committees (audit, and nomination/remuneration),
while advise committee membership is no more a problem for women.
Table 9 presents the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition for the sample of observations related to seasoned
directors. The objective is to evaluate whether the quota has had any impact on female directors who
had already broken the glass-ceiling before the quota. In the pre-quota era, the gender gap was around
3.7%, lower than on the full sample (over the full period). As mentioned before, we have observed
that this gap was mainly due to difficulties to access the audit committee and the advise committee.
After the quota, the gender gap has decreased up to 2.3%, but the explained part is still significant,
at 2.7% (even if the global gender gap is no longer significant). The regulation seems to have had a
positive effects on seasoned women, but the effects are quite slow: gender inequality within board is
still observable for at least audit committee, even for seasoned women.
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As a conclusion, the within-firm gender fees gap analysis suggests that female directors ultimately
have a smaller role inside the boardroom, as compared to male directors. Before the quota, female
directors experienced a gender fees gap of 3.7%, mainly explained by the difficulties to enter audit and
advice committees. On average, after the quota, we observe a gender gap of 5.7%. For the seasoned
female directors, the gap has decreased but is still persistent (2.3%): while the access to advise com-
mittee is no more a problem, the access to the audit committee continues to negatively affect women
influence within boards. For the unseasoned female directors, the gender gap is larger and mainly
driven by the lack of monitoring committees’ memberships and individual characteristics. While we
do not have evidence of pure discrimination, our results indicate that despite the quota, women are still
not key players inside French boards. In particular, they face an inner glass ceiling to reach monitor-
ing committees - that however would be the most appropriate given their propensity to be independent.
5 Conclusion
Gender diversity in the boardroom has come to the front of the public debate, when the EU adopted
in 2014 a Directive promoting a target of 40% of female directors by 2020. While several countries
have enacted gender quota, the efficiency of a regulatory approach is under strong scrutiny. All studies
so far have examined the Norwegian case (with the exception of Sabatier (2015)); this paper provides
new evidence based on the French quota. We investigate the way large listed companies have coped
with the regulation: who have they appointed? To do what? We contend that answering these ques-
tions is a prerequisite to assess the overall efficiency of a quota in terms of corporate governance. In
particular, it circumvents the difficulties inherent with a direct estimation of the relationship between
board diversity and firm performance (problem of causal inference, first compliers, changing board
structures, etc.).
We report evidence that compliance with the law has been mainly driven by the appointment of new,
unseasoned female directors, rather than by the use of seasoned females. Multi-directorships for female
board members has not dramatically increased following the quota. Crucially, we show that the pool
of unseasoned female directors presents specific characteristics, due for a part to a supply shortage:
they are, in particular, younger and more independent than male directors and seasoned women, and
the share of foreigners is more important than in any other groups of directors. In addition, they have
less financial literacy than seasoned directors.
We then show that female directors support a within-firm gross fees gap of roughly 5%. One half of the
gap is explained by positions (committee memberships and chairing) and the other half by individual
attributes (age and tenure). While we do not report evidence of pure discrimination against women in
French boards, we rather observe a process of ”positional” gender segregation, with female directors,
both seasoned and unseasoned, somehow confined to advising committees, less strategic and less re-
warding than monitoring committees. Importantly, this segregation is driven not only by differences
in observable attributes characterizing unseasoned female directors but also by discretionary choices
made by companies not to promote female directors as key players. The quota has been unable until
now to bridge the gender gap within boardrooms.
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Indubitably, the gender quota has had a positive effect by opening the doors of the boardroom to
new women. However, the latter still face an inner glass ceiling to reach monitoring committees. It
could be a temporary issue if seasoned directors keep the positions they had before the regulation
until they leave the board or if firms decide to replace first male cheerleaders (directors without any
committee) by female directors. In addition, tenure of unseasoned directors is mechanically bound to
increase. The overall effect of the gender quota should then be analyzed after a few years, especially
in light of the next 40% threshold in 2017. The pool of potential candidates should indeed grow up
and offer new profiles. Anyhow, in the short run, our results indicate that it is dubious to observe
major improvements in corporate governance quality following the implementation of the gender quota.
From the policy maker perspective, the quota has been successful insofar as new women, and not only
seasoned female directors, have been appointed in French boards. It first opens new career perspec-
tives for talented women and could have some positive externalities on the likelihood to become CEO
(Oakley, 2000; Wang and Kelan, 2013; Mohan, 2014). However, the frictions in the short term within
the corporate governance system, due to the fast compliance of firms to the law, have to disappear in
the next years. In particular, the access of female directors to the audit or compensation-nomination
committees, major organs in the decision-making process at the top of the firm, should be a specific
concern for politicians, practitioners and academics.
From a research perspective, several questions remain to be investigated on the French case. First,
our research did not evaluate how firms’ outputs have changed after the law, in terms of innovation
(Miller and Del Carmen Triana, 2009), risk management or strategy (Francoeur et al., 2008). Also,
women may be more able to take into account the demands of strategic stakeholders in the decision-
making process such as employees, customers or suppliers through Corporate Social Responsibility
policy (CSR). Post et al. (2011) and Harjoto et al. (2014) show for example that gender diversity is
positively correlated with CSR performance. There is finally one major issue we do not deal with in
this paper: the impact of the quota on gender equality on the labor market and within workplaces,
through top-down effects. The most recent empirical results on the Norwegian case do not confirm the
presence of such top-down effects (Bertrand et al., 2014). In the French case, we lack for the moment
reliable evidence.
Second, there is an internationalization of directors. To our knowledge, this phenomenon has not been
highlighted in the Norwegian case. Further research is needed to understand why these directors decide
to enter the French market, what their incentives (reputation, career) are and which positions they
hold in their home countries. Is this internationalization always related to improvements in corporate
governance quality or to a need for French firms to expend their activities abroad by merger and
acquisitions for example? Masulis et al. (2012) provide mixed effects of foreign directors on corporate
governance in U.S. companies.
Third, firms did not seem to face difficulties to comply with the gender quota. Nevertheless, voluntary
approach (i.e. comply or explain) was unsuccessful before the law, with a low and stagnant fraction
of female directors in large French listed companies. The European Commission has recently given a
clear objective to EU member States but with flexible methods. It would therefore be interesting to
compare the effectiveness of voluntary and legislative approaches across European countries.
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6.2 Variables
Table 11: Definition of variables
Variables Definition
Panel A : Directors’ characteristics
Female Dummy equal to 1 if the director is a woman
Unseasoned Dummy equal to 1 if the director got her first seat in the
SBF120 after the quota
Seasoned Female Dummy equal to 1 if the female director got her first seat in
the SBF120 before the quota
Unseasoned Female Dummy equal to 1 if the female director got her first seat in
the SBF120 after the quota
Unseasoned Male Dummy equal to 1 if the male director got his first seat in
the SBF120 after the quota
Tenure Number of years the director has been sitting in the board-
room
Independent Dummy equal to 1 if the director complies with the
AFEP/MEDEF definition (Corporate Governance code) of
independence
Foreigner Dummy equal to 1 if the director is not French
Age Director age in years
Busy Director Number of seats that the director has a given year in the
SBF120
Financial Expertise Dummy equal to 1 if the director has a professional experi-
ence in finance
Industry Expertise Dummy equal to 1 if the director has a professional experi-
ence in the same industry than the firm where she/he sits
Ecole Polytechnique Dummy equal to 1 if the director is graduated from the Ecole
Polytechnique
ENA Dummy equal to 1 if the director is graduated from the Ecole
Nationale d’Administration
HEC-ESSEC-ESCP Dummy equal to 1 if the director is graduated from HEC,
ESSEC or ESCP
IEP Dummy equal to 1 if the director is graduated from the
Institut d’Etudes Politiques
Grande Ecole Education Dummy equal to 1 if the director is graduated from either
Ecole Polytechnique, ENA, HEC-ESSEC-ESCP or IEP
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Variables Definition
Panel B: Role inside the boardroom
Number of Committees Number of committees where the director sits
Number of Committees
Chairs
Number of committees that the director chairs
Number of meetings Number of committee meetings
Audit committee Dummy equal to 1 if the director sits in the audit committee
Audit committee chair Dummy equal to 1 if the director chairs the audit committee
Number of Audit meeting Number of audit meetings that the director shall attend
Compensation/Nomination
Committees
Dummy equal to 1 if the director sits in the compensation
and/or nomination and/or corporate governance committees
Compensation/Nomination
Committees Chair
Dummy equal to 1 if the director chairs the compensation
and/or nomination and/or corporate governance committee
Number of Compensa-
tion/Nomination Committees
meetings
Number of compensation and/or nomination and/or corpo-
rate governance meetings that the director shall attend
Advising committees Dummy equal to 1 if the director sits in the advising com-
mittee
Advising committees Chair Dummy equal to 1 if the director chairs the advising com-
mittee
Number of Advising meetings Number of advising meetings that the director shall attend
Panel C: Directors fees
Director fees Annual amount in nominal euros paid to an individual acting
as a director
Log(Director fees) Logarithm of director fees
Directors fees ratio Rate of individual director fees with respect to firm average
directors’ fees
6.3 The French elite network
The sociological literature on business elites in France commonly highlights two main networks: en-
gineers and (former) high civil servants (see Kadushin, 1995; Bauer and Bertin-Mourot, 1995; Frank
and Yasumoto, 1998). These networks are connected to Grandes Ecoles system. In France, after high
school, students may choose to go to classic university system for either a bachelor or a master degree,
or to apply for Grandes Ecoles program. In the first case, there is no selection of students and only a
minimal grade is required to pass the exams. In the second case, students are selected based on their
grades after high school and during the program (after 2 and 5 years) in order to have access to the
best and most well-known schools in France. The “Grandes Ecoles” system is divided in three groups:
engineer schools, business schools and political science schools (Instituts d´ Etudes Politiques). The
Ecole Nationale d´ Administration (ENA, political science school) and the Ecole Polytechnique (En-
gineer School) are the most prestigious and give access to high level civil servant positions at least for
the best students. The ENA is a training school for high civil servants in economics, political science,
accountability and finance. All students have a master of arts or sciences, before entering ENA thanks
to a very selective competitive exam. After graduation, all students have to take a high-level civil
servant position and then belong to the “Grand corps de l´ Etat” (Kadushin, 1995). Ecole Polytech-
nique is the most well-known engineer school with a very selective entry competitive exam. The most
talented ones are able to get a high-civil servant positions (scientific Grand corps de l´ Etat) and the
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others join the private sector. All students are fast tracked to high level positions in government, state
and private sectors. Both schools lead to prestigious bureaucratic career such as cabinet advisor, head
of ministries, government position or top management of private and state owned companies. 20% of
French largest listed firms are managed by Ecole Polytechnique or ENA graduates over the 1992-2003
period (Kramarz and Thesmar, 2013). Two complementary networks might be pinpointed: the first is
forms by the three top French business schools (HEC, ESSEC and ESCP) and the second by political
science schools (IEP). As shown by Nguyen (2012), between 1992 and 2001, 61% of the SBF120 CEOs
are graduated from a Top Grande Ecole previously mentioned (29% from Ecole Polytechnique and
21% from ENA).
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6.4 Trend in director fees over the 2006-2014 period
Figure 1: Average director fees (Nominal e), 2006-2014
Notes: This figure presents the firm average director fees over the 2006-2014 period. We exclude directors who
do not directly receive the fees such as executive directors (insiders), some shareholder representatives (State
representatives for example) or employee representatives. Also, we exclude chairmen of the board because in
many cases, the chairman and the CEO are the same person (50% of firm-year observations) and are not com-
pensated specifically for their job of director. We eliminate directorship corresponding to directors entering or
exiting the boardroom in the course of the year, as they are likely to be less involved at the board-level. We drop
two firms that pay directors in dollars and follow the SEC regulation (Arcelor Mittal and Stmicroelectronics),
and two companies (Alten and SES) that do provide individual information on fees for the whole period. Finally,
we trim the director fees at the 1 and 99% levels in order to avoid our estimation being driven by outliers. The
sample includes 111 firms.
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